Accueil > Techniques de la documentation juridique > Méthodes > Thésaurus juridiques > La taxonomie nuirait à la fabrication des décisions de justice
jeudi 14 septembre 2006, par
C’est la conclusion, sévère, de ce papier d’Emily L. Sherwin, publié aux Cornell Legal Studies Research (n° 06-020) et sur le SSRN :
"Legal Taxonomy"
Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-020
Sherwin, Emily L., "Legal Taxonomy" . Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-020 Available at SSRN : http://ssrn.com/abstract=925129
Il est rare d’avoir des articles sur la taxonomie (l’étude du classement des notions, une des étapes de la construction des ontologies), notamment en droit.
Ici, l’auteur pousse sa réflexion en dégageant de son expérience et d’une recherche très documentée, deux sortes de méthodes de taxonomie : une très (trop ?) simple, qui, finalement, n’est pas utile pour la construction de décision, et une autre, cette fois très complexe, et qui risque de tromper les juges.
Je me permets de reproduire sa conclusion, qui est édifiante, mais je vous engage à lire l’intégralité de son travail, très américano-centriste, mais qui peut facilement être transposé aux besoins européens.
I have identified two primary methods of legal classification : formal classification and reason-based classification. Formal classification is modest in its aims, helping to clarify the law and facilitate legal communication. It does not purport to present courts with standards for
decision.Reason-based classification, at least in its normative versions, claims the more ambitious purpose of guiding, and improving the quality of, judicial decisionmaking. In fact, however, a project of reason-based taxonomy is unlikely to promote judicial virtues of consistency, like treatment, stability, and constraint. A taxonomy assembling the higher-order principles that explain and support an ideal code of legal rules can be useful from a law-making perspective, but may do more harm than good if presented as a source of guidance for judges. This is because judges operating under an ideal set of determinate legal rules are likely to reach the best decisions by following the letter of the rules rather than the principles behind them.
A taxonomy assembling legal principles drawn from existing legal materials is a confused enterprise. This type of taxonomy is designed to guide decisionmaking but in fact leaves ample room for unconstrained and inconsistent application of principles. To the extent it does constrain, it constrains judges to construct and apply morally imperfect legal principles rather than correct moral principles in deciding cases.
Contact : EMILY L. SHERWIN
Cornell University - School of Law
Auth-Page : http://ssrn.com/author=245700
Full Text : http://ssrn.com/abstract=925129
ABSTRACT : In recent years, a debate has arisen among English scholars about schematic classification of the substantive rules of private law. This essay examines the ambition to taxonomize law and the different methods a legal taxonomer might employ.
Two possibilities predominate. The first is a reason-based taxonomy that classifies legal rules and decisions according to "legal principles" thought to justify them. Reason-based taxonomy of this type offers courts a set of high-level decisional rules, drawn from legal data, for use in deciding new cases and evaluating precedents. The second possibility is a formal taxonomy that classifies legal materials according to rules of order and clarity. Formal taxonomy serves less ambitious objectives, such as facilitating legal analysis and communication. It does not provide decisional standards for courts.
I conclude that reason-based taxonomy, classifying law according to legal principles, is a misguided enterprise. It may be more satisfying to the taxonomer, but it will not improve the process or outcomes of judicial decisionmaking.
Voir en ligne : Sherwin, Emily L., "Legal Taxonomy" . Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-020 Available at SSRN
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